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Cet article met en lumière l’entrelacement entre une couverture média-
tique sensationnaliste et semi-officielle et sa réception par les gens ordi-
naires de la Berlin impériale, à propos de l’affaire mettant en cause un «suri-
neur» en 1909, et ses répercussions dans l’arène urbaine. À l’époque, les
contemporains associèrent rapidement les «méfaits du surineur» à ceux de
Jack l’éventreur, à Londres en 1888. Toutefois, certaines caractéristiques
étaient propres au criminel berlinois, en particulier l’attitude proactive en
matière de presse du département d’enquête criminelle et la coopération de
la presse berlinoise. Ma thèse est que cette coopération semi-officielle bien
établie fut décisive dans la construction de l’affaire. La police lança une
chasse à l’homme publique, dont le succès reposait sur la coopération effec-
tive de la police et de la population urbaine. L’enquête publique ne fut cepen-
dant pas dépourvue de frictions et de malentendus, les relations entre les
autorités et les «sujets» étant ambiguës et conflictuelles. En outre, la circula-
tion quotidienne d’éléments sur l’enquête en cours accompagna la multipli-
cation des «méfaits du surineur», de sorte qu’il y eut beaucoup d’imitateurs
et qu’on ne parvint à supprimer les attaques que grâce à une extension des
moyens ordinaires de recherche coordonnés par la police.
This article highlights the interdependent interlacing of semi-official sen-
sationalist media coverage and its appropriation by ordinary people in Impe-
rial Berlin, by examining the criminal case of a knifer in 1909 and its reper-
cussions in the urban arena. In 1909, contemporaries swiftly associated “the
misdeeds of the knifer” with the London Jack the Ripper Case of the year
1888. In spite of the intriguing Ripper tag particular characteristics distin-
guished the Berlin knifer: the proactive press policy of the Criminal Investi-
gation Department and the cooperation of Berlin’s newspapers. My conten-
tion is that the well established semi-official cooperation between
Department IV and Berlin’s press was instrumental in ‘the making of the
1 Dr Philipp Müller is Lecturer in Modern German History at University College London. Prior to his
current position he earned his Ph.D. at the European University Institute in Florence. Subsequently
he was Post Doctoral Fellow at the Research Centre Media of History - History of Media at the Uni-
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im Berlin des Kaiserreichs, Campus, Frankfurt a.M., 2005 (Historische Studien; 40); co-edited with
A. Lüdtke, MedienAneignung in historischer Perspektive, Sozialwissenschaftliche Information/
SOWI, 34 (2005) 4; “‘Éducateur’ ou ‘mauvais garçon’? Le capitaine de Köpernick et les boule-
versements du paysage médiatique dans l’Allemagne de Guillaume II”, in Requate, Les médias au
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case’. The police instigated a public manhunt, and the success of this under-
taking crucially relied on the effective cooperation of the police and the
urban population. However, the public investigation of the case was not
without frictions and misunderstandings; relationship between the authority
and the “subjects” was ambiguous. Furthermore, the daily circulation of
clues of the ongoing investigation went with the proliferation of “the mis-
deeds of knifer”. Consequently, copycat action was rife, and the suppression
of the “stabbings” was achieved only by extending the ordinary means of the
public search coordinated by the police.
INTRODUCTION
THE «LONDON BELLY-RIPPER» AND THE «RIPPER IN BERLIN»
At the time of the infamous ‘Jack the Ripper’ in the late 1880s, Berlin dailiessuch as the Berlin Lokal-Anzeiger had seen fit not to devote much attention
to the lengthy and multifaceted media coverage of the case undertaken by their Lon-
don equivalents2. About twenty years later however, with similar occurrences taking
place in Berlin, leading Berlin dailies would begin to associate the violent actions of
a knifer with the ominous phenomenon of the “London Belly-Ripper”3: the headline
of the Berliner Morgenpost exclaiming “A Ripper in Berlin” on 16 February 1909,
the Berliner Tageblatt carrying a similar “No trace of the Ripper” on the same day4.
Several days earlier, on 10 February 1909, the police had received several reports of
young women and girls being attacked with knives near Schleßischer Busch in
South East Berlin; en passant an apparently young man had plunged a knife into the
abdomens of female passers-by. The identical pattern of action suggested that only
a single individual had been involved in carrying out these “knife attacks”, this and
other details prompting both policemen and medical experts to notice a seemingly
“exceptional similarity” between the recent incidents in Berlin and the legendary
Ripper Case. The day following these first reports, however, the press’ associative
imagination had given way to a more precise labelling of the perpetrator and his vio-
lent acts : the Berlin Morgenpost’s headline reading “Misdeeds of the Knifer”, the
Berliner Tageblatt reporting on the “[t]wo new victims of the Knifer”5. These head-
lines considered the attacks and their circumstances more precisely, omitting the
misleading Ripper tag and its tacit assumptions.
Indeed, these two criminal cases significantly differed in several respects.
Between August and November 1888, an unknown perpetrator killed five prosti-
tutes in London’s Whitechapel district, mutilating both their bodies and their inner
sexual organs; in February 1909, the police registered 41 attacks with a small knife
against women at various locations in the German capital. In contrast to the Jack the
Ripper case, the victims in Berlin lacked any unifying social criteria, seemingly
being chosen at random at different sites in the German capital. Their only common
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2 Walkowitz (1992, pp.191-228); Curtis (2001).
3 Berliner Tageblatt (BT) 11.2.1909, No. 75, 1. Spl., 1.
4 Berliner Morgenpost (BMP) 11.2.1909, No. 35, 1.Spl., 1 ; BT 11.2.1909, No. 76, 1. Spl., 1.
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characteristic was that they shared the same gender: all the victims were female6.
Furthermore, the ominous Jack the Ripper killed all of his five victims; in Berlin,
only one of 41 recorded victims died of her wounds. Indeed, the vast majority of the
victims would merely suffer from “very small skin and laceration wounds”; in eight
cases only the victim’s clothes had been cut, these women emerging otherwise com-
pletely unscathed from the attempted attacks on the their bodies7.
Above all, there was a crucial difference in the media coverage of the two cases
as in the two capital cities the relationship between police and press crucially dif-
fered. Scotland Yard’s policy regarding the Ripper case was not to furnish London’s
dailies with details about the on-going investigation, but instead the police sought to
prevent any intrusion by the London press8. If journalists sought to answer the press-
ing questions and demands of the urban public in autumn 1888, they were obliged to
borrow from circulating narratives, metaphors and literary motifs9. In doing so, it
was they that accounted for the occurrences in East London: London newspapers
thus helped to fabricate the legendary and multilayered Jack the Ripper narrative. In
contrast to this, the proactive and inclusive press policy of the Berlin Criminal
investigation department resulted in semi-official media coverage. Indeed, it is the
contention of this essay that the established cooperation between the Criminal inves-
tigation department and Berlin’s daily newspapers was a formative element of the
urban crime drama in Imperial Berlin, marking a crucial difference between the
alleged Berlin Ripper and its notorious original. Furthermore, the semi-official press
policy was an integral element of a public police investigation that affected the
alleged Berlin Ripper case in several ways. Firstly, the search in public initiated an
essential phase of the urban crime drama, the public investigation: in cooperation
with the urban public, the police attempted to track down the perpetrator. Secondly,
in the context of the public investigation, the circulation of detective clues and advice
provided the pretext for copycat action that in this particular case contributed to the
dissolution of the unity of perpetrator and deed and, ultimately, culminated in the
“epidemic of the stabbings”. Thirdly, in the end, the search of police and public
amounted to collaborative suppression of the “stabbings” (Messerstechereien). In
contrast to the London Ripper case, the search for criminals in the German capital
city provided an encounter between the police and the urban public. Cooperating as
they were, the police and the many engaged in re-establishing the public security and
safety. The cooperation was not unambiguous and in the context of the imminent cri-
sis conflict and contestation was rife. However, the “stabbings” ceased: from 20 Feb-
ruary 1909 onwards, no further attacks were reported and henceforth the case was
silenced, although not one of the many Berlin knifers had been brought to justice10.
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6 This rule did not lack one exception: on 19 February 1909, the seventeen years old Georg
Lewandowski was attacked with a knife by a passer-by in Andreasstrasse, BLA 20.2.1909, No. 93, 3.
7 Lindenberger, Lüdtke (1995); Brückweh (2006).
8 Walkowitz (1992, p. 191); Curtis (2002, pp. 116, 141 & 194).
9 Walkowitz (1992, p. 197); Curtis (2002, pp. 116f., 137, 254, 313 & footnote 29).
10 The fundament of this analysis is an examination of the media coverage of the prevailing newspapers
of Imperial Berlin, the Berliner Tageblatt, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, and the Berliner Morgen-
post. In addition to this, I inspected the media coverage of the BZ am Mittag and the relevant records
and files of the Berlin police headquarters (BPH) and the Prussian Interior Ministry. General obser-
vations and arguments concerning the context of the urban crime drama in Imperial Berlin rely on
the investigation: Müller (2005a).
THE PRESS POLICY OF DEPARTMENT IV
Starting during the mid 1880s, the Berlin’s Criminal investigation department
pursued a proactive and inclusive press policy. Disregarding the different political
leanings of the many Berlin dailies, the police delivered, in principal, its official
press notices to all “newspapers of local significance”11. Prior to the implementation
of this policy however, Department IV had generally only informed those newspa-
pers considered conservative and “state-loyal” of its actions and investigations. The
impetus to change from this policy of limited engagement with Berlin’s wider press
would come from the director of Department IV of the Berlin police, Count von
Pückler, who in February 1885 contemplated cooperation with the less politically
benevolent, “liberal and oppositional newspapers”12. As one of the few institutions
of Police in Prussia that were open minded to reforms and renewals during the Impe-
rial Period13, the Criminal investigation department was able to at least gradually
overcome its institutionalised political bias14. The main reason for the reform of its
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11 Landesarchiv Berlin (LAB) A Pr. Br. Rep.030 Tit.28 No. 806, Draft 25.6.1885, 328f., 329.
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13 Reinke (1991); Funk (1986); Johansen (2001); cf. Lüdtke (1992); Reinke (1993).
14 Cf. Requate (1995, 393); Müller (2009); Bösch (2009).
Illustration I. Headline of the Berliner Morgenpost, 11 February 1909
press policy in 1885 was the relative circulation of the various Berlin dailies : “If we
publish only in Berlin’s conservative newspapers that are rarely read by the masses,
[the press releases] do not answer their purpose and should better be discontinued.”15
The circulation of those organs of the press that were well-disposed towards the
government was indeed relatively low: the “conservative and government-friendly”
Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung sold about 7,500 copies; the circulation of the
“independently conservative” Reichsbote was about 12,300; furthermore, the “inde-
pendently conservative” Post did not sell more than 14,500 copies per issue. Clearly
then, these papers could hardly function as a mouthpiece of the police in order to
garner public support for the authority. In contrast to the conservative papers above,
the circulation of those newspapers considered “liberal and oppositional” fared
better : the circulation of the “extreme progressive Jewish democratic” Berliner
Zeitung reached about 17,500 copies; the circulation of the “extremely progressive”
Berliner Presse was about 29,700; and the Berliner Tageblatt, a “progressive
scandal-sheet”, sold about 60,000 copies per issue16. Suffice it to say, in 1885,
Department IV acknowledged the manifest journalistic power relationships in the
German Capital and adjusted its press policy accordingly.
In the subsequent years, the press policy of the Criminal investigation depart-
ment was subject to further change: Department IV deliberately extended its arsenal
of public means, ready to be deployed in the daily combat of urban crime. With a
view to this, the police authority assured the cooperation of the Deutsche Reichs-
bahn, as well as managers of movie theatres in Berlin, in helping to disseminate various
official statements. Special arrangements concerning the publication of extra
editions were also made with the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger and the Berliner Morgen-
post, further guaranteeing the extended and swift circulation of official information
in the metropolis and its environs. It was, however, far more the media landscape of
the Imperial capital, as well as its transformation, that affected the press policy of
Department IV – ultimately also altering the media quality of its semi official press
releases. It was true that in 1885 the conservative newspapers were already at a con-
siderable disadvantage: liberal newspapers out matched their circulation. The
breakthrough of a mass press was yet to come however. By the end of the 1880s,
three new large publishers – Mosse, Scherl and Ullstein – began to prevail. Their
numerous journalistic products came to dominate the press market of Berlin; the
flagship products of the three publishing houses, the Berliner Tageblatt, the Berliner
Lokal-Anzeiger, and the Berliner Morgenpost also reached unprecedented circula-
tions of any newspaper ever before seen in the German Empire. As a result, the press
notices of Department IV did not only reach the readers of so called quality papers
such as the Berliner Tageblatt, but also the new readers of the Berliner Lokal-
Anzeiger or the Berliner Morgenpost. As the Criminal investigation department did
not revoke its decision to deliver press notices to any “newspaper of local signifi-
cance”17, the press policy of the police increasingly reached the wider public of the
capital city. Concomitantly, the semi-official press releases surfaced in a new media
context : the modern urban daily, rendered affordable for ordinary people and with a
strong emphasis on local affairs.
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THE PLOT OF THE «STABBINGS»
In view of the “misdeed of the knifer” in early February 1909, Department IV
took its usual course of action and instigated a public investigation. As soon as the
police had established a connection between the attacks on Martha Kahlert, Martha
Fillinger and Marie Schäfer on 9 February 1902, it sought to “resort to the widest
public” as Traugott von Jagow (President of Berlin Police, 1909-1916) described the
regular public campaigns18. The next day, Berlin police headquarters published
announcements at the advertising pillars of the city, promising a reward of 1,000
Mark for information or actions that led to the capture of the perpetrator. Internal
reports were also drafted, with further information being published in the official
press organs of the police, for example the DeutscheFahndungsblatt, to inform all
branches of the German police19. A couple of days later, the search reached a turn-
ing point as the police were to notice several attacks per day. From 14 February
onwards, the profile of the misdeed began to diffuse; the attacks occurred in all parts
of the city and the pattern of action varied, the unity of perpetrator and deed dis-
solved. From now on, Department IV was obliged to assume a plural of perpetrators
and thus it began to intensify its public manhunt.
THE PUBLIC MANHUNT IN FEBRUARY 1909
In engaging in public campaigns, the police generally did not miss the opportu-
nity to highlight its concerted efforts to track down the criminal ; the work of the
police was a leitmotif of any public campaign. Despite their vain efforts to “render
[harmless] the wrongdoer” in February 1909, projections of the police’s industrious
activity were underpinned by both general remarks and more detailed narrations of
the efforts undertaken20. With its lack of “any distinct clues [about] the criminal”21,
the Berlin Ripper case urged the police to at least emphasise their endeavours:
whilst the Berliner Tageblatt and the Berliner Morgenpost informed their readers
that the police would work on the solving of this crime “feverishly”, the Berliner
Lokal-Anzeiger also assured its readership that “the most comprehensive measures
have been taken to ascertain the culprit”22. Indeed, it was even deemed worthwhile
to mention that, if the perpetrator had escaped again after another attack on a female
passer-by, at least leading police officers in automobiles had arrived at the crime
scene almost immediately23.
A further characteristic of such public campaigns was the detailed representation
of detective clues. The search for the ‘knifer’ in February 1909 was no exception in
this respect ; any attempt to solve a major crime incorporated a public manhunt. In
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18 GStA Berlin I.HA Rep.77 Tit.235 No. 1 Bd. 14, Newspaper Clip, Tageszeitung 10.3.1912, 20.
19 LAB A Pr. Br. Rep.030 Tit.198B No. 1934, Report February 1909, 92-95, 94; BLA 11.2.1909,
No. 76, 2; BLA 11.2.1909, No. 76, 1.
20 BT 11.2.1909, No. 75, 1. Spl., 1.
21 BLA 12.2.1909, No. 77, 3.
22 BT 16.2.1909, No. 85, 1. Spl., 1 ; vgl. BT 19.2.1909, No. 90; BMP 11.2.1909, No. 35, 1. Spl., 1.
23 BLA 14.2.1909, No. 81, 3.
this particular case, however, the search for the “fiend”24 was hampered by the very
few and very vague indicators as to the culprit’s personality. Given the lack of any
“palpable trace”25 of the perpetrator, the police displayed what evidence they had
been able to find, and thus represented in detail the tiniest clues that might aid in
solving the case: the victims’ descriptions of the perpetrator, articles of clothing or
pieces of jewellery that the police had found, the weapons used by the perpetrator,
as well as the pierced garments and wounds of the victims. In principle, and as long
as it was in line with the internal search strategy of the police, anything that could
relate to the perpetrator was passed on to the publishers of Berlin dailies.
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26 BLA 11.2.1909, No. 75, 3; BMP 11.2.1909, No. 35, 1. Spl., 1.
Illustration II. Evidence illustrated in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger
ASKING AND DEMANDING:
THE APPEAL TO THE PUBLIC
The deliberate dissemination of detective information was an integral aspect of
“the appeal to the public” (Publikum). At the beginning of a public investigation
into a crime, the police explicitly asked the public for support. In view of the afore-
mentioned lack of evidence in February 1909, the Criminal investigation depart-
ment emphasised the reliance of the police on the “observations” and “reports” of
the public26 in helping to solve the Berlin Ripper case: its Director, Councillor
Hoppe, acquainted the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger with the fact that “[i]n this case we
are more than ever dependent on the cooperation of the public”, and underscored
“that, for the Criminal investigation department, it is probably impossible to arrest
the knifer without the help of the public”27. In order “to keep up permanently / the
interest of the public / in this difficult matters”28, the police put up official announce-
ments in pubs and restaurants in the area of the Schleßische Brücke; newspapers
subsequently alluded to these very announcements by copying them into their
reports. During a brief period where there were no reports of further attacks, the
Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger reminded its readers that it would be hazardous “if the public
calmed down during this momentary state of tranquillity. On the contrary, the most
intense vigilance is necessarily required”29. Time and again, the general and broad
appeal to the public was completed by very precise instructions and clear advice.
For example, the police called upon particular professions to sharpen their ears and
eyes, and also publicly addressed single people that were “urgently requested” to
“promptly” report their observations to the police30.
The Criminal investigation department did not have to wait long for police “per-
ceptions” (Wahrnehmungen) furnished by various members of the public, partici-
pating actively in the search for the “fiend”. A few days after the beginning of the
public campaign, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger sketched the ongoing exchange
between the police and the urban public :
In the Police interrogation office. / There is a buzz of activity in the police head-
quarters, a continual coming and going. The head office of the police investiga-
tion in this crime case is in room 36, on the ground floor of the headquarters.
Commissioned with the solving of the bloody deeds, police detective Peters holds
office there. The door of the office does not stand still : one visitor hands it into
the hands of the next one. A tangled mass of reports is on hand and they are com-
plemented continuously by new ones. Supported by his staff, the police detective
busily inspects the reports. / The incoming reports accumulate, some are also
delivered in person by the informers and then they have to be recorded. Pneuma-
tically delivered letters, ordinary letters, telegrams and wired reports are coming
in abundantly. So far, all of the examined reports lack any value: they drew the
police attention to misleading tracks, or their worthlessness was obvious and they
went straight into the wastebasket. But under high pressure the inspecting and
examining continues31.
The literary quality of the scene notwithstanding, this sketch of the Police inter-
rogation office not only served the embellishment of the published press releases in
the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, but also conveyed various other messages catered for
potential informers. The representation stressed the activity of the policemen; addi-
tionally it informed the readers of both where to go and whom they were supposed
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27 BLA 11.2.1909, No. 76, 2 [Explanation by the Director of CID Hoppe]; vgl. BT 11.2.1909, No. 76,
1. Spl., 1 [Explanation by the Director of CID Hoppe]; BLA 15.2.1909, No. 83, 3; BT 15.2.1909,
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28 BLA 12.2.1909, No. 77, 3.
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30 BT 11.2.1909, No. 75, 1. Spl., 1 [Explanation by the Director of CID Hoppe]; BT 12.2.1909, No. 78,
1. Spl., 1 ; BLA 11.2.1909, No. 76, 2.
31 BLA 11.2.1909, No. 76, 1 [Original emphasis]; cf. BT 12.2.1909, No. 78, 1. Spl., 1.
to contact should they wish to communicate with the police. As a final act, the short
paragraph also served to implicitly encourage the public to furnish the authority
with expedient details only32.
CO-SEARCHING:
THE POLICE AND THE URBAN POPULATION
During the investigations into the Berlin Ripper case, the police considered
details relating to “mentally ill persons” especially useful33. From the inception of
the search, the Criminal investigation department had entertained a suspicion that “a
lunatic” was accountable for the recent knife attacks. A “list of suspicious insane
persons and epileptics” provided the police with the means to check on relevant per-
sons “who could be considered capable of committing such a deed due to their for-
mer life and disposition”; the police authority used this list to examine the alibis of
known “lunatics dangerous to public safety” in Greater Berlin34. Lunatic asylums,
penal institutions and the police authorities of the wider German Empire were also
contacted, the Berlin police force advising them of their suspicions and asking for
their feedback. Complementing the internal police investigation, the public search
strategy would also target these “suspicious lunatics”: the initial public announce-
ment by Ernst von Stubenrauch (Director of Berlin police headquarters, 1908-1909)
called for the generation of “reports about conspicuous and suspicious behaviour of
male persons, especially of insane persons and epileptics” by the wider Berlin
public35.
In the days following this first announcement there were to be no shortage of
“reports about nervous personalities or any other peculiar demeanour”36. The
Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger summarised the first three days of the campaign: “It is
almost perilous, if one only looks faintly similar to the women-murderer. In a twin-
kling of an eye innocent people are arrested by members of the public and some-
times carried away to the police.”37 Similarly, an unemployed bricklayer, on his way
to Gärtnerstraße 18 to discuss working with a foreman, would experience the con-
crete physical effects of the collaborative efforts of police and public :
As he entered [the building] to inspect the silent porter [an index of all tenants],
two girls stood in front of the door [of Gärtnerstraße 18]. The children came in
the house, too, and rang the door bell of the flat of their parents. One of them
believed that the man wanted to do her harm. When the bricklayer left again,
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[Announcement of BPH 10.2.1909].
33 BMP 11.2.1909, No. 35, 1. Spl., 1.
34 Ibid. ; LAB A Pr. Br. Rep.030 Tit.198B No. 1934, Report February 1909, 92-95, 94; BLA 11.2.1909,
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35 BT 11.2.1909, No. 75, 1. Spl., 1 ; BMP 11.2.1909, No. 35, 1. Spl., 1 ; BLA 11.2.1909, No. 75, 3
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1909, 92-95, 94; cf. BLA 11.2.1909, No. 76, 2 [Statement of Professor Kohler].
36 BLA 11.2.1909, No. 75, 3.
37 BLA 14.2.1909, No. 81, 3; BMP 14.2.1909, No. 38, 1. Spl., 1 ; BT 14.2.1909, No. 81, 1. Spl., 1.
because he could not find the foreman here either, he was followed and arrested.
Again rumour had it : ‘The knifer has been arrested !’ The man was brought to the
police headquarters, but was released as soon as his innocence was revealed38.
As the article in the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger suggested, reports and the arrests
were occasionally grounded in a match between the vague personal description of
the wanted knifer and the accused. More often though, peculiar demeanours or “sus-
picious phrases” provided the pretext for arrests and persecutions; further to this, the
possession and the public demonstration of a knife time and again prompted swift
interventions in the urban arena39. Men simply under the influence of alcohol were
also often arrested: the blend of lacking bodily control and ambiguous or unclear
expressions repeatedly prompted passers-by to assume that they were dealing with
the wanted ‘mentally insane’ person40. The experience of the “cook L.”, who was
under such circumstances compelled to stay under arrest for two days, serves as a
fitting example. ‘L.’, being heavily drunk, collapsed on the street. As a man helped
him up, the drunken cook threatened his helper with his knife, saying: “’You can get
a stab, too !’” He was brought to the police headquarters41.
Concomitant with the specific public campaigns, the search resulted in a surplus
of security and public safety. Given the resonance of public investigations with the
wider urban public, the search for a particular criminal was often accompanied by
the arrest of wanted thieves and tricksters, fugitive prisoners and escaped inmates of
lunatic asylums42. Even if the police did not succeed in apprehending the perpetra-
tor specifically responsible for the recent attacks, they did manage to seize a number
of other wanted criminals43. This side-effect of the intensification of measures taken
to guarantee the public’s security and safety was at least welcomed by the police, if
not partially calculated by the authority as objectives to be achieved in tandem with
their on-going public campaigns.
Taking a similar line, the Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger also appreciated that “these
dreadful occurrences [the misdeeds of the knifer] will have at least one good effect :
the return of a number of released dangerous lunatics into their asylums”44. The con-
ditio sine qua non of these intensified security measures, however, was the effective
collaboration of the many. Berliners did not limit themselves to mere acts of inform-
ing, but actively took matters into their own hands. In order to catch the wanted
criminal, the many brought suspects to bay, arrested them, and subsequently either
delivered them to the nearest police station or the next police officer they encoun-
tered on the way45. Ordinary people appropriated essential policing tasks, tasks that
included the observation of suspicious behaviour, the arrest of suspects, and the
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custodial escort of suspects until such a time or place that they could be handed over
to the authorities. In doing so, they empowered themselves and executed, at least
momentarily, state power46.
THE AMBIGUOUS RELATIONSHIP
BETWEEN POLICE AND PEOPLE
It would only been very few cases that the actions of “the voluntary criminal-
ists”47 were ever publicly lauded. Generally speaking, the police and their semi-
official mouthpieces, the Berlin dailies, were far more likely to express their dismay
at the ineffectual acts of cooperation they encountered from the urban public. The
situation in February 1909 was certainly no exception to this ; coupled with a lack of
positive results in the investigation, the performance of city dwellers had generally
let down the police’s expectations. In tandem, both police and press supervised and
admonished actions taken by the many: misleading reports and calls were time-
costly affairs that consumed the energy of police officers ; on the streets, in the var-
ious neighbourhoods of Berlin and also in pubs and restaurants, the decrying of
innocent passers-by as potential suspects resulted in distracting interventions in
public life ; “idle talk” and “rumours” about the alleged arrest of the knifer jeopar-
dised the effective coordination of the investigation. In short, the alleged “nervous-
ness”48 of the urban public obstructed the ability to cooperate with the on-going
investigation in line with the intentions and objectives of the police. Rather than
establishing a panoptic state, with the intended aim of placing the authorities in a
position to observe without being seen49, the public search strategy employed by the
police produced an unclear state in which everybody claimed to have spotted a
criminal who was, in reality, still unknown and on the run. As the many did not
comply (or only complied in part) with the instructions of the police, the authority
of the police was thus undermined.
The attitude of the police towards its potential informers and supporters was
rather ambiguous. Characterising the police’s relationship towards the public50 were
the two coexistent forms of ‘asking’ and ‘demanding’. On the one hand, members of
the public were by no means legally obliged to report any of their observations, and
so the police were left with no other option than to ask for collaborative support. On
the other, the expectation of the public’s compliant cooperation asserted an authori-
tative power position, echoing the military spirit of the Prussian police and its close
institutional ties with the army51. Official discourse regarding the “public” (Pub-
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likum) relied on the notion of the “subject”: in view of the seeming lack of the
required reasoning and discipline, the police were to keep a tight rein on “the public”:
in order to correctly align the collaborative acts of the many with the investigations
of the police, “the public” required constantly both instruction and correction. For
the police, diverging from official instructions was not an option and so the actions
taken by ordinary people remained incomprehensive and insufficient. The public
performance of the many did not make any sense from the police’s viewpoint ; the
constant criticism is therefore not much of a surprise.
The repetitive scolding of “the public”, a leitmotif of any public police investi-
gation, did however ignore a particular attribute of the public’s actions: ultimately,
the many did intend to help in apprehending the wanted criminal. Observing and
informing, persecuting and (co-)searching, arresting and delivering were all public-
social actions, characterised by a willingness to collaborate with the authorities.
Indeed, the police officer ‘patrolling his beat’ was not alone when caring for law and
order; after all, ordinary people were also concerned with matters of “public secu-
rity and morality”, and their multifarious participations contributed to ‘law and
order’ in different ways. As revealed in Thomas Lindenberger’s pioneering study
Straßenpolitik, a general condition of this willingness to cooperate was an everyday
and permanent “readiness” of ordinary people52. This “readiness” prompted a verbal
and physical commitment to public affairs : either in close cooperation with the
police or without external support, the many actively opposed breaches of social
rules and the disruption of the order of the everyday. However, the “readiness” of the
populace in the urban arena does not necessarily match with the Marxist thesis of an
antagonism between “the people” and the “power bloc” however53. Participatory
actions were rather typified by a wayward opportunism: they seized the opportunity
provided by the sensational event and appropriated the detective clues in their own
way. As a result, ambiguous verbal expressions or public gesticulations with a knife
could thus provide valuable indicators, perhaps leading the ‘ready’ public to the
wanted criminal. However, the various social actions did not necessarily correspond
with the rationale of the search, or the detective reasoning of the police. The appro-
priations of the manhunt by members of the public depended rather on their indi-
vidual enjeu and the situation in which they found themselves.
The act of participating in the search for the Berlin Ripper was also imbued with
sensationalism, due to the most important medium of the metropolis : the newspaper.
Media coverage, the use of other media and the concerted efforts of the search trans-
formed the public investigation into a media event, attributing a distinct significance
to the matter which went far beyond a mere police issue. The public investigation
was a sensationalist affair in the urban arena, and, apparently, it was worthwhile to
appropriate its public-symbolic value by contributing to it in various ways: in the
pubs of Berlin, people bragged about their personal acquaintance with the fugitive;
on the streets they attempted to track down the wanted criminal, with or without the
support of the police; in the telegraph offices, the offices of the newspapers or in the
interrogation rooms of the police, the public found authority figures willing to listen.
The many were granted the opportunity to inscribe themselves into the daily repre-
sentation of the metropolis : being acknowledged for one’s endeavours in the news-
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paper was as much attractive as any publicly announced or proven dedication to the
authorities. Semi-official sensationalist crime cases produced momentary chances
of empowerment; the numerous and multifaceted appropriations of these opportu-
nities by the inhabitants of Berlin are proof indeed of the attractive potential of sen-
sationalist crime cases.
LIMITS OF THE SEMI-OFFICIAL MEDIA COVERAGE
Whereas ordinary Berliners intensively appropriated the search, the leading
newspapers of Berlin were to barely exploit the journalistic potential of this
particular case. In terms of morale and enjeux, there was a vast gap between the
semi-official discourse in the newspapers and the wide spectrum of actions taken in
the urban arena.
In a remarkable contrast to the portrayal of the London’s Jack the Ripper, the
media coverage in Berlin largely focused on the public investigation itself. Despite
their various political leanings, Berlin dailies turned into mouthpieces of the police.
This is not to say that the leading newspapers, particularly the more liberal Berliner
Tageblatt and the Berliner Morgenpost, did not generally oppose the politics of the
Prussian police however; criticism of the police was an established and distinct fea-
ture of public debate in Imperial Germany54. Furthermore, such public manhunts put
the police in a position to be criticised: their politics were exposed, and subse-
quently faced heightened public scrutiny. In the case of failures or shortcomings, the
liberal papers time and again seized the opportunity to challenge and criticize the
Prussian police for its lack of competence. Last but not least, the journalists of
Berlin knew very well how to play with literary motifs, and were quite used to draw-
ing comparisons with literary examples; with reference to more dramatic genres,
journalists would translate ongoing affairs into literary dramatic texts55. In February
1909, however, they refrained from producing a dreadful as much as delighting nar-
rative of the current affair. Apparently, there was little reason to do so: the “stab-
bings” were a worrying matter ; the results of the ongoing investigation disappoint-
ing; and the circumstances surrounding the death of Miss Schäfer were truly
lamentable: due to the small size of the wound, the arterial injury went unnoticed
and so resulted in her bleeding to death. The suddenness of the violent acts, the arbi-
trary choice of the victims, the vague details of the personal descriptions, the lack of
any “palpable trace”, all this culminated in the invisibility of the perpetrator and the
unpredictability of his re-emergence: the “horror of Berlin” was untraceable and
yet, at the same time, the terror of the knifer was omnipresent56. But not even this
ominous void would be filled by literary imagination.
A further distinct feature of the Berlin Ripper media coverage was the restraint
from any literary dramatisation of “the erotic nature”57 of the stabbings. Here, again,
the detective context of the public investigation prevailed; the text of the press
releases delivered twice daily by the Criminal investigation department dominated
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media coverage of the knife attacks. Nevertheless, on the occasions that the perpe-
trator was described as a “fiend”, “monster”, “women-murderer”, “madman”,
“lunatic” or “perversely inclined man”, the generally silenced erotic connotations of
the “knife attacks” would resurface58. The press notices penned by Department IV
contributed to this in their own way, given that they accurately described the details
of the criminal deeds. The representation of the crime and its surrounding circum-
stances were rooted in the detective interests of the police; the detailed information
supposedly providing “voluntary criminalists” with clues that would enable them to
actively contribute to the on-going police investigation. Although such deliberate
and concerted public instruction required the description of indecent circumstances,
the discussion of these circumstances was not considered appropriate. The urge to
communicate thus conflicted with the morale constraint of public speech – in other
words, the public representation of items relating to police investigations had
reached a serious obstacle, though these matters still needed to be discussed. The
moral conceptualization of the public sphere in Imperial Germany established a bor-
der around public speech, and also confined the public representation of details
relating to criminal investigations in newspapers. Phrases were shortened and
abbreviated as a result, though even these could not completely ignore the erotic
undercurrent of the stabbings. In newspaper articles, the deed was designated an
“attack”, an “assault” or an “attempted assassination”59, or, in other instances, the
course of action was simply reduced to its technical dimension. The Berliner Lokal-
Anzeiger, for instance, revealed that Marie Loobs had “received a stab in Kirchgasse
around 2.15 pm”60 and that Berta Gröske “was injured by a stab into her abdomen”61.
Indeed, those women and girls who had been attacked were thereupon also termed
“the Stabbed” (Gestochene)62. As a final act, this ambivalent expression was even
put in the mouth of the victim Maria Schäfer, recreating their alleged experience of
the violent act : the words “A young man has stabbed me !!”63 were purportedly her
final utterance, as she recovered consciousness for the last time before her death.
ACCOUNTING FOR THE MISDEEDS:
THE EXPERT KNOWLEDGE OF THE MEDICAL DOCTORS
Although absent in the press, the debate concerning the “erotic” undercurrent of
the stabbings was to be found somewhere else: in special comments and the addi-
tional articles of medical experts. Due their expert knowledge, male doctors enjoyed
the privilege of broadly debating “the sexual nature” of the stabbings, and their
pathologic origins. Placed in the central sections of newspapers, their comments and
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examinations both reflected the increasing significance of criminology64, and also
marked the privileged position of experts in the public discourse on crime that took
place prior to any proceedings in court65. Whereas the public investigations of the
police attempted to answer the question “who is the culprit?”, explanations given by
a diverse range of medical doctors focussed on the “nature” of the criminal act, as
well as on the “type” of the criminal66. In this context, the neurologist Professor Dr
Eulenburg referred to existing investigations in “sexual-pathological studies”: he
drew comparisons to the other “varieties of fiends”, from the “inksplasher (Tinten-
spritzer) to the sex killer”, and also noted that the perpetrator “gets some sexual sat-
isfaction [from] stabbing with a knife”67. Distinguishing the most recent stabbings
from other “delicts of rudeness” that occasionally occurred in Berlin, Professor
Kohler concluded:
On the contrary, the course [of the misdeed] indicates a clearly distinct type of
psychosis, a classic type of a sex murderer. Hereupon refers not only the majority
of the immediate succession of several assaults[,] but also the fact that the knife
was stabbed into the abdomen68.
In contrast to Kohler’s findings, the Director of the Bicêtre in Paris, Dr. Rubinow-
itsch, surmised that “the mysterious criminal [instead] performed [...] under the influ-
ence of a mania”69. Whereas these circumstances were only mentioned very briefly in
the main articles, and certainly in a laconic and neutral tone, such circumstances were
at the centre of the debate between medical experts, and were explicitly discussed in
the jargon of their professions. However, this discussion of lust, sexual satisfaction,
and the erotic nature of the stabbings was compliant with one essential condition:
these themes and issues only surfaced in the context of a medical discourse, a dis-
course that emphasised the pathological and immoral qualities of its object.
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Illustration III. Headline of the BZ am Mittag,16 February 1909
THE “EPIDEMIC OF THE STABBINGS”:
COPYCAT KNIFE ASSAULTS AND INVENTED ATTACKS
Regardless of whether or not the knifer was mentally ill or just immoral, several
Berliners did not consider the concerns and arguments voiced by the experts of
medicine and psychopathology. On 14 February 1909, Berlin newspapers reported
that the Criminal investigation department had to assume the existence of more than
just one knifer. Although knife assaults on girls and young women had occurred for
the first time in the evening of 9 February, the subsequent circulation of this news
from 11 February onwards seemed to prompt further attacks, swiftly carried out and
in imitation of the original misdeed. The suspicions of both police and press fell on
“lads”, “scallywags”, “rogues”, and other “certain bad asocial elements”70: in short,
the “rude rabble of which there is some in any big city – and that certainly is rela-
tively strongly represented in Berlin”71. Apparently, male youth or young men
seemed to enjoy mimicing the wanted knifer. For the perpetrators, the gender of
their victims suggested that they would only encounter (supposedly) defenceless72,
or at least certainly astonished, young women. Additionally, the swift technique of
the perpetrator gave the individual a chance to inflict considerable pain on a woman,
all the while operating at a significantly diminished risk of being apprehended.
Above all, copying the knifer’s assault against women contained an inherent sexual
undercurrent, an undercurrent that was worded in either the detective language of
the police or the expert language of medical practitioners.
The copycat stabbings lacked any explicit instructions or literary dramatisations
in the newspapers, and yet “certain immoral asocial elements [in] Greater Berlin”
restaged the “stabbings” in their own way. They made use of the clues that had been
circulated in the diverse urban media; by imitating the original knifer, they appro-
priated the public-symbolic status of the search. As Dr. phil. Rudolph Hennig
pointed out :
The incitement is the pleasure to hear people talking hereof in anxiety, to see the
deed published in the official announcements put up at advertising pillars, and
they feel that they are something great : their hysterical drive to render themselves
interesting, at any cost, is amply satisfied73.
The dramatic appropriation of the knifer’s assault strategy also commented on
the helplessness of the police, as well as on the measures that they had taken in order
to arrest the criminal : to the young copycats, the knifer that had been initially
dubbed the Berlin Ripper was far more convincing than the vein undertakings of the
police74.
The counterpoint to such imitation stabbings by young men was the feigned
knife assaults by women and girls. The actions of Bertha Marzahn, a 48 year old
worker who had been attacked by a knifer on 16 February, provide a illustrative
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example of this kind of behaviour. Several days after she had been initially attacked,
Marzahn was to report another “knife attack” to the police on 22 February:
As [Bertha Marzhan], running some errands, passed by this building around 9:15
in the morning, she had been jostled by a young man who then accelerated his
pace and escaped her eyes. Only later, she sensed a strong pain in her right thigh.
As she look down on her clothing, she noticed that there was a clear cut like the
first time75.
In order to clarify the circumstances of the second and relatively unlikely “knife
assault” on Bertha Marzahn, the police began to search for witnesses. The next day,
the young man indicted in the above statement reported himself to the police, pro-
ducing a very different record of the incident :
He “[went] calmly his way [...] when suddenly Miss M., who he was not acquain-
ted with, rushed up to him and embraced him. Puzzled, the man stopped while
Miss M. continued her way and shouted loudly for help as she was about fifty
steps away from him”76.
Marzahn’s dramatic performance was rooted in material motifs. Since she had
been signed off as sick for several days following her initial attack, she wanted to
continue her sick leave and receive sick leave payment. From the inception of the
public investigation, young women and girls had approached the police in order to
report a “knife attack”. In contrast to the “mischief” of “rascals” and “scallywags”,
the imitation of being attacked did not prompt any serious public critique77 – the fic-
titious suffering did not, after all, inflict any harm to anybody. What is more, the
police simply distinguished between the real and the fictitious by transforming the
women’s clothing into the touchstone of truth: whereas the lack of any evident
damage suggested the ‘victim’ was no more than pretending, distinguishable knife-
marks on women’s clothes induced the authorities to assume a ‘true’ assault had
taken place. Nevertheless, although these feigned assaults were deemed harmless,
the copycat action of young men did indeed harm women and girls, and threatened
public security and safety in Berlin.
From the viewpoint of police, medical experts and journalist commentators,
copycat stabbings and feigned assaults were perceived as an illness or a temporary
infection. For these observers and readers, the imitation of criminal demeanours
originated from urban sensationalism and the psychology of sensationalist crime cases
– as illustrated on many other occasions. Criminal actions imbued by sensationalist
media coverage would be “infectious [and] suggestive”, helping to elicit the action of
imitation. In order to account for the recent happenings, commentators referred to
similar cases of “psychic infection”78, as well as previous knife assaults such as the
murder of Lucie Berlin in 190479. A particular precedent had already been set for the
knifer in Berlin however, coming in the form of London’s Jack the Ripper80:
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It is a psychological fact of experience, whose significance has been acknow-
ledge only very recently, that each sensationalist and startling criminal case cha-
racterised by a certain originality has the dangerous effect that very shortly after
further similar criminal actions are committed, reproducing all details with
utmost accuracy81.
The best form of “prohibitive means against [the] further mimicking actions”, it
was thought, would be the apprehension of “one of these criminals”82.
“WORKING HAND IN HAND”83:
THE END OF THE STABBINGS
In order to ultimately contain the “imitation drive” (Nachahmunsgtrieb)84 of the
“rabble”, Department IV acknowledged its obligation to undertake further measures.
As a result, the police raised the advertised award from 1000 to 3000 Mark, and con-
tinued its public investigation in cooperation with the population of Berlin. Besides
the intensification of tried and tested means, the police also decided to take addi-
tional institutional actions, and to initiate further private measures as well. Hoping
that the combination of “governmental and private measures”85 would finally result
in the arrest of the knifers, the police on the one hand “increased their public as
much as secret presence of forces in the metropolis”, and on the other integrated the
central logistical institutions of the city into the wider public search. Intensifying
their presence by establishing “special taskforces”86. The police ensured that several
hundred police officers “were continuously patrolling the streets of particularly
emperiled districts.” Patrols were reinforced, “railways and other gathering points
of larger crowds” were placed under observation, and “undercover agents, some of
them dressed in women’s clothing” were deployed at various endangered parts of
the city. As an additional measure, the Berlin police force appealed for all of its offi-
cers, if off duty, to voluntarily support those on patrol87.
Private surveillance measures also pursued the stated aim of observing “the hus-
tle and bustle on the streets”88. On 16 February 1909, the President of the Lichten-
berg Police asked the chairman of the Associationof Houseowners of Lichtenberg
and Boxhagen-Rummelsburg for support, arguing that a “private supervision of
buildings, houses as well as the streets” should render it feasible to catch the culprit
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in the act89. The President of the Berlin Police achieved a similar agreement with the
chairmen of the Association of the House- and Landowners, the Tram and Omnibus
Company, the Overhead Railway and the Subway, and the Security Company in
Berlin; in order to establish an effective “supervision of their houses”, it was
advised that “homeowners should, in groups, employ one man who observes the
street and, in the case of an attack, initiates the persecution of the perpetrator and fol-
lows the man, too”90.
Ultimately, the police and private measures proved effective. From 20 February
onwards, only ten days after the first reported stabbings in South East Berlin, the
assaults on women and girls ceased. This achievement was due to a deliberate trans-
formation, into police observation points, of the logistical positions in the city that
had played a crucial role in the criminal acts of the knife attacks: the streets and cor-
ridors where the perpetrators had, unawares, caught their victims. As a result, the
unconditional invisibility of the perpetrator, and therefore the certainty of escaping
any attempted arrest, was no longer guaranteed.
Although the police extended their measures beyond the ordinary boundaries of
a public campaign by “requesting”91 private associations and institutions, the police
still operated within the ordinary framework of the public police investigation.
“Working hand in hand” with civic institutions as they were, the police attempted to
establish a massive presence in the metropolis. The police deliberately incorporated
civic agencies and particular groups of people, delegating to them special policing
tasks; with this, the internal strategies of police thus multiplied in the urban public.
The successful suppression of other attacks on young women and girls was therefore
achieved by a publicly visible dissemination of policing competences in the urban
arena: the police enjoined “the public”, and vice versa.
CONCLUSION
In the end, the police succeeded in restoring safety and security in the capital
city. Their strategy effectively combined the physical and discursive presence of
various forms of policing. Through this strategy, which involved both the enhance-
ment of police’s public methods and the co-option of the public in aiding with their
investigation, the dreadful occurrences of February 1909 were brought to an end.
Yet the investigation ultimately failed in apprehending either the original perpetra-
tor or any of the subsequent copycats – a failure that went without any further scan-
dalisation in Berlin’s dailies. When pushing for reform, the Director of Department
IV, Count von Pückler, had anticipated such kind of effect ; in 1885 chief instigator
of the reform noted, “the service catered for the newspapers [i.e. the aforementioned
proactive press policy] will not remain without effect on their [the newspapers’]
position and will make them more liable to concede to the wishes of the police head-
quarters”92. The proactive press policy of Prussian police therefore successfully
silenced their failed attempts to bring any of the perpetrators to justice, the police’s
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discursive presence in the media pitching the fact of their failure into oblivion. In the
case of London’s Jack the Ripper, the unwillingness of Scotland Yard to communi-
cate with the press had produced rather the opposite effect : silence on behalf of the
detectives prompted the press’ invention of the Jack the Ripper legend, a legend that
continues to play on our imagination in view of the manifest failure of London’s
police in 1888. However, Berlin’s reformed press policy was not a panacea for all of
its police investigations. On other occasions, this very same proactive press policy
was a clear and resounding failure; the semi-official notices of the police reports
were turned against the authorities, whilst the wanted criminal rose to prominence.
The mixed results of this policy notwithstanding, Berlin’s police acquired an essen-
tially new tool, one that allowed for the promotion of police concerns in public and
the presentation of matters of public safety and security. As Department IV
embarked on the reform of its press relations, the police adjusted their policy to the
political conditions of the Berlin press market at the time, prior to its thorough trans-
formation a few years later. In order to reach the wider public, the Criminal investi-
gation department was therefore willing to acknowledge the prevailing position of
the liberal papers in the capital city.
Despite the adaptation of the Criminal investigation department to its surround-
ing media landscape, the learning process of the Prussian police was limited in
several respects. In the first instance, the police clung to their political bias – con-
tinuing to occasionally favour conservative newspapers and to withhold official
information from a publisher if they were to be penalised for insubordinate media
coverage. Such practises contradicted the core objective of reform: to use the
police’s newly required means to enhance their position, promote their agenda and
garner public support. Similarly, the adjustment of the police’s press policy did not
prompt an overhaul of the institutional make up of the Prussian authorities. The
small and almost invisible reform of 1885 did not eclipse the prevailing notions of
Prussian policing; the distinct and superior self-understanding of the police
remained, along with a persistent disregard of the public. Although it is true that the
police were willing to engage with the wider public, they did not to assume a more
civilian approach like that epitomised by the notion of the «gentle Bobby »93. Fur-
thermore, the press policy of the police was subject to change. Although the official
press notices was persistently considered an original police matter, the transforma-
tion of Berlin’s media landscape altered the effect of the very same press notices
published and disseminated in a essentially changing urban public. Thus is it does
not come as a surprise that the attitude of the police remained; social change made
the police aloof of the popular repercussions of its press policy. The police neither
acquired an understanding of the public dynamics to which it significantly con-
tributed, nor the streetwise actions of the urban crowd. The authority thus did not
meld with the popular nature of public affairs that they stirred so well.
Nevertheless, the police still contributed to public affairs, and also informed the
urban crime drama in the capital city. In the previous decades and centuries, the per-
secution of a criminal climaxed in the spectacle of retribution, with the authorities
increasingly choosing to conceal the retributive act from the public eyes94. The the-
atre of punishment gave way to the «hunts for the criminal» (Verbrecherjagden),
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although the execution of death sentences continued to attract some attention. Thus,
in the urban crime drama, the search for criminals and the public investigation of
their misdeeds preponderated. Through the use of modern mass media, the search
for criminals was put on public display – the media coverage transforming the detec-
tive work of the police into a sensational and highly popular affair. In contrast to the
institutional credo of the police, the public investigation of crimes opened up new
horizons for (co-)policing. These searches produced a new encounter between
police force and public, an encounter that certainly did not match with the police’s
self portrayal as superior, nor with assumptions of a nervous and ill-performing pub-
lic. Against this backdrop, the term «moral panic»95, albeit occasionally attributed
to sensational crime cases, does not prove sufficient. First, the concept of «moral
panic» hardly covers the complex interdependent interlacing of news and its appro-
priation during the campaign of the Berlin police; secondly, the concept echoes a
leitmotif of the public campaign, i.e. the scolding of the public. Underlying this leit-
motif was the problem of the fear of « the new reader»96. These ‘new readers’ came
in the form of the shop owners, craftsmen, servants, and workers, whose compara-
tively recently initiated consumption of Berlin’s dailies staked their political claims
in the urban arena. The reading of the Berliner Morgenzeitung or the Berlin
Lokalanzeiger marked just the beginning of their political participation in urban
affairs, very much to the dismay of the formerly privileged reading public. Given the
“readiness” of ordinary people, public police investigations prompted their inter-
vention in public affairs. Criminal actions endangered society and its order, were a
serious breach of social rules, and initiated a crisis97: the liberty of the wrongdoer
thus meant a continuing threat to the public’s security and safety, and necessarily
required public intervention. Offences demanded the subsequent restoration of
order, and prompted undertakings that ranged from on looking to talking, from
observing to informing, from investigating to following and even arresting. Regard-
less of whether or not these actions complied with the inherent conventions and
expectations of the police, the actions of the many “voluntary detectives” were dri-
ven by a willingness to contribute to the restoration of social order. The public man-
hunt offered the urban public opportunities to do this, even if the appropriation of
these chances went against the grain of the rationale of the police. In this way, the
imitations of the original Berlin Ripper, as well as the feigned “knife attacks”, were
as much characterised by wayward opportunism as the numerous actions taken to
catch the culprit.
The public manhunt affected the power relationship of the police and the public.
For the many, public police investigations produced a wide range of opportunities to
contribute to the policing of society. Particularly in the case specifically discussed in
this piece, searching for the criminal required the cooperation of both the public and
the police. For the police, cooperation meant the enforcing of their superior position
of the authorities, actions that strongly required the leadership and the instructions
of the police. To a certain extent, the multifarious acts of cooperation certainly
served this end: the many demanded leadership, and lent authority to the police
whenever they either addressed a policemen on his beat or detailed their perceptions
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of an alleged criminal in one of Berlin’s many police stations. Indeed, during the
period of crisis, acts of informing flourished, and detective police work became
increasingly popularised. When examining the collaborative efforts to hunt down
the criminal (e.g. the agreement with private association, the collective hunting of
suspicious persons), this becomes even more plain. Depending on the situation and
the enjeux of « the voluntary detectives» however, the notion of Prussian police
superiority proved illusionary. This was particularly so in February 1909, when the
police were unable to either establish any evidence relating to the crimes, or to con-
tain the following « epidemic of the stabbings » without the (semi-)compliant sup-
port of the many. What is more, the numerous independent arrests of suspicious
passers-by, not to mention the various copycat stabbings and feigned attacks, amply
illustrate the limits of the alleged institutional superiority. As a result then, the police
was forced to continuously reassert its role as the primary instigator of the on-going
public investigation: the police corrected misleading rumours, rebuffed members of
the public for their inadequate behaviour, and instructed the public by presenting
essential clues and good examples of adequate support. Rather than a “general
perspective” then, or even a “word city” as proposed by Peter Fritzsche98, sensa-
tional crime cases like the 1909 Berlin stabbings produced a multitude of voices and
inextricably interlinked actions. The newspapers of Berlin relayed the attempts of
various actors to track down the criminal, channelling and amplifying as they did so.
Whilst searching for the wrongdoer, the various actors of urban public not only com-
municated about the whereabouts and identity of the perpetrator, but also about their
say and performance, their role and conduct in the urban arena. In the period of cri-
sis, misunderstanding was rife ; through this the polyphony of the German capital’s
transforming urban public was revealed.
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